Universal healthcare and superannuation, and the cost of thinking ahead

If doing actions that reward a future self is perceived as costly could we justify these actions.  If thinking about our wealth, human capital, or ability to live in 10 years time is inconceivable, will me over consume now?

In essence this sort of discussion is saying that we discount our future selves TOO steeply (compared to whatever the underlying presumption of a “fair discount factor” is).  Is this a fair value judgment to make in policy?  It is not one I would make, but it appears to be the basis of some overaching policies such as universal healthcare and superannuation.

In this case, we don’t need to worry about a “moral hazard problem” even though (empirically) the actions of moral hazard will appear.  Why?  Because the actors aren’t thinking about the future selves and so these “inefficient” outcomes would have occurred in the first place!  Policy helps to correct this by transfering resources to our future selves to improve outcomes relative to the REAL counterfactual (rather than the idealized one where agents choose on the basis of our subjectively fair discount rate).

I think it is important to keep this issue in mind, because it is a closet behavioural assumption behind most policy.  If we buy this value judgment, then we will believe in a larger role for government then if we didn’t.

Economic models

From Aaron Schiff:

A model should not be judged solely by its assumptions (although highly dubious assumptions are not a good thing). Rather we should focus on the model’s ability to teach us something, and its ability to explain the economics of something in a plausible way.

To summarise, a model does:

  • Highlight the incentives or tradeoffs that are relevant in a particular economic situation.
  • Generate predictions about the behaviour of economic agents in response to controlled changes in conditions.

I took this from a good post by Aaron Schiff.  I agree with it.

Note that the purpose of economic models isn’t prediction (as we have been discussing) – but we do want a testable hypothesis, in order to make our models scientifically valid.  So the model MUST be testable, but this is not a sufficient condition on models.

Furthermore, predicitive accuracy is not part of testability – as the difference could stem from a change from one of our ceteris paribus (CP) assumptions.

The goal is explanation and description.  And trust me the grey line between prediction and testablility is problematic.  But for the purpose of discussing economic models, the fact that our CP assumptions are the things that break unexpectedly does not invalidate the usefulness or purpose of economic models.

Note:  I will stop writing on this soon and go back to NZ economics.  For me this stuff is interesting, and I like to have a record of where my head is at.

Attacks from the left and the right on economics

One thing I have noticed in my time is that people on the political left and right both attack “mainstream economics” with abandon.  This is good, as a discipline has to be able to explain itself widely and be willing to face criticism.

However, it is one of the elements of these attacks that interests me here.  Namely, how each side of the political spectrum attacks the “focus” of economics, or the framing – specifically in terms of the market and government.  Here is my oversimplified understanding of this element:

  • Left:  Economists are focused on markets.  They start from a place where markets are perfect, and markets provide the best outcomes and work from there – therefore they have a pro-market bias.
  • Right:  Economists focus on markets and resource allocation.  The focus on markets makes them dwell on policies that solve “market failures” rather than paying attention to the possibility of government failures!  As a result they have a bias to push policies that are anti-market.  Furthermore, by discussing the allocation of resources they drive the feeling that the economy can be controlled – which also leads to a bias towards government involvement.

I find both of these attacks suffer from the same problem, they avoid trying to understand why economists use the counter-factual they do, and the way economic analysis stems from it.

In itself, economics is not about giving policy prescriptions, it is about “trying” to “objectively” describe and explain an economic situation.  We find the elements of a market (which is the voluntary trade relevant to the issue at hand), and try to model them.  When then describe a “perfect counterfactual” and look at how these elements cause outcomes to differ.  We then do nothing.

In this case, the purpose of our counterfactual is to give some idea about how a more “realistic” outcome compares to an “ideal” outcome.  We do not say that the ideal outcome is possible, we do not say that any policies could move us towards the ideal outcome, and as strict economists we do not place hefty welfare judgments on the relative outcomes.  The counterfactual is solely there to allow us to describe, in some sense, how the elements in the model impact on the outcome – it helps us to describe.

The next stage is more “subjective” (I am putting commas around objective and subjective as even the “objective” analysis involves a number of subjective assumptions – but I digress), and it is not in the realm of economics per see.  Economists often move on to the policy analysis stage, but it is an additional element, that requires different skills than those that are central to economics.

The biases the left and right discuss tend from their view of the value judgments made by analysts at this stage of analysis – they are not relevant in a discussion about economists.  As a result, although the left and right often like to tarnish all economists with the same brush this is just not the case – economics is not the issues they disagree with here, but the value judgments made in the application of economic models.  The critique is of analysts they do not agree with, not the discipline as a whole.

Of course, I do not expect individuals with a political mind to ever properly accept or represent this significant difference – as there is too much satisfaction and political capital associated with attacking all economists 😀

Mankiw is right again – this time on prediction

This time on how Economics as an academic discipline will not have to have the wholesale changes some peoples are suggesting.

He is right when he says the focus of economists and economic teaching is not on prediction.  However, I would also say that economists HAVE sold the idea that they can predict when talking to people, even if they personally realised this isn’t the primary role.

In some sense this comes back to Friedman.  During the positivist revolution in economics he stated that it didn’t matter so much what we assumed – as long as it was predicatively accurate.  Furthermore, our “value” for policy analysts and the such has often been tied to predictive accuracy.  Here we never agreed with this.

There are two ways to understand current economists methinks:

  1. Economists want to explain and understand – and that is where the value is:  This fits the academic economist view, but often ends up with no predictions.
  2. The Tarot card view:  This fits what economists do when they have to make predictions.  They use archetypes (models of aggregate behaviour), historical knowledge (data), and intuition to get a feeling of where the economy will head and the risks around it.  Even the more technical models (think DSGE models) have elements of this.

Both these services have value – by building knowledge and understanding.  But economics as a discipline should be based on its ability to adequately explain and provide understanding – not its ability to predict (especially given the issues with data).

Economists add value by describing, explaining, and painting risks – but they do not have magic time traveling powers.

This all reminds me of:

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/economics03.jpg

Source (previous post)

Maths and economics

There has been a lot of negative talk about the maths in economics – like a huge amount.  Just look at these links, some of them are poor and reactionary, but some of them are excellent and the last two are my favourite (*, *, *,*,*,*).

Now although I believe much of this attack is excessive, and I believe the role of maths in economics is very very important, like all protestations there is a grain of truth to be found.

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Need more behavioural relationships please

I started life as a microeconomist, which is why the sort of discussion about nominal shocks going on between Sumner, Kling, and Woolsey seems a little weird to me.

To horrendously oversimplify the positions in order to make this post easier to tie together, Sumner seems to state that the Fed needs to print money with a nominal GDP target in mind, Woolsey suggests that the Fed should change inflationary pressure given a set real GDP target, and Kling states that we only have real shocks and so the idea of a “nominal shock” is not of use.

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