Teach someone to fish …

Give a community fish, and you feed them for a day.

Teach a community to fish, and they will overfish the common pool resource.

Give someone in the community a property right over the fish, and they will fish sustainably but will be endowed with monopoly rents over fish.

So surely you see why I’m vegetarian 😉

Note:  I’m not being serious – I don’t hate you for the fact you kill animals.  After all, as my niece tells me, I’m even worse as I recognised the sentience of animals and still enslave them for eggs, milk, and honey.

Let’s just leave it there so I can avoid sounding like any more of a douche.   In actuality the moral of the story is that we want to allow property rights over the fish, but to ensure that we can redistribute the property right determined surplus in some way (while trying to avoid changing the incentives around how much to fish) – as a result lets just watch the MR University video on Ostrom.

Redistribution and economics

Noah Smith has an excellent post about the “macro wars” that are going on at the moment (ht a reader).

Most of the time, econ bloggers and columnists write as if we were speaking to an audience that has taken a few econ classes. But the more widely read our posts and columns become, the more our real audiences fail to fit this ideal. Most people who read us are smart and educated. But smart and educated non-economists (“normal people”, if you will) see econ – and especially macro – in fundamentally different ways from economists.

I’ve been thinking about these differences for a while, and I’ve reached two major conclusions:
1. Normal people see macro as inherently political.
2. Normal people see macro as being mostly about redistribution rather than about efficiency.
Indeed, this is true.  Even if an economist manages to convince someone they are not political, they will assume the questions we are trying to answer are redistributive ones and not efficiency ones.

Back in 2003, Paul Rubin wrote about this.  His view was the “folk economists” (people without sufficient training in economics – read pretty much everyone) view social interactions as zero sum games, and that this came from evolution and our pre-history.  Economics, specifically efficiency arguments, involve “breaking” these common sense arguments – as we are discussing positive sum games (gains from trade).  His conclusion is that the solution to this issue is to focus on efficiency more strongly, and to teach “folk economists” about economics [Note:  As I mention here I think this view is too harsh to folk economists, understanding heuristics is something WE have to do if we want them to throw away “common sense”]

However, at the moment as Noah states:
So most normal people seem to see macroeconomics as political (even if most economists don’t!), and see redistribution as the main question. The result is that public discussions of macro, on the blogs and elsewhere, usually break down into tribal camps, and thinkers are often seen more as tribal champions than as technocratic advisors or sources of intellectually interesting ideas. Many people see the “-isms” of macro – “New Keyneisanism”, “New Classicalism”, etc. – as political advocacy rather than as dispassionate scientific attempts to explain the world around us.
This is indeed true.  But there are two things here – and in both of them I think economists have to admit fault:
  1. For all the talk about not being in camps, and trying to do objective analysis, economists often turn around and “jump into camps”.  Folk economists can’t observe when it is the “economist” talking and when it is the “ideologue”.
  2. As Noah states in the post, society is VERY interested in distributional issues – and economists often chuck them in the too hard box.

Now you may think I’m being unfair on economists – something that is strange given how much I love them.  However, this is one area where I think economists make subtle logical leaps from “we are only discussing efficiency as it is the only thing we can comfortably discuss” to “only efficiency matters”.  This isn’t on purpose, and NO economist would say that, but the discipline DOES push things that way.

Here is Robert Lucas discussing the discipline saying the opposite.

Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution. In this very minute, a child is being born to an American family and another child, equally valued by God, is being born to a family in India. The resources of all kinds that will be at the disposal of this new American will be on the order of 15 times the resources available to his Indian brother. This seems to us a terrible wrong, justifying direct corrective action, and perhaps some actions of this kind can and should be taken. But of the vast increase in the well-being of hundreds of millions of people that has occurred in the 200-year course of the industrial revolution to date, virtually none of it can be attributed to the direct redistribution of resources from rich to poor. The potential for improving the lives of poor people by finding different ways of distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently limitless potential of increasing production.
Yes folk economists understate the importance of growing the pie, and they understate the importance of the institutional relationships that exist for doing this (and the long-term responses to relative prices involved in that).  But, economists can use that as an excuse to ignore distributional consequences, or to have to “fit” distributional concerns in an efficiency framework.  I hardly see how economics is focusing too much on distributional issues when the distributional consequences of policy changes are supposed to be one of our main areas of interest!  I’m sorry, but saying we should ignore distribution because pushing out the technology frontier is a “win-win” sounds both oversimplistic and, dare I say it, naive.

Economists are not moral philosophers, they cannot say that something is good or bad especially not in relation to some cardinal value.  But as a discipline we can understand issues of distribution, and we do discuss them – just often not with the same discipline we do when discussing efficiency effects.

When I defended Mankiw it was because he was at least willing to mention distribution and he was saying what assumptions his views hung off.  When I reviewed the Spirit Level I was amazed at its virtual inability to understand the complex relationships involved, and why their conclusions can not be termed as completely “scientific” – their views and analysis are naive (even if I have sympathy for parts of the argument), and “economic science” can do this better.  When I compared economists to Tarot Card readers I was trying to indicate that the language and views we give create their own sort of knowledge for people – a stock of ideas about how the economy works.  If we have done analysis around efficiency and distribution, we need to put more thought in how to communicate those ideas – as they can be taken as statements of “fact” instead of conditional statements for the question at hand.

If you have a society where people are interested in trade-offs and distribution, economists should confront that fact.  Just saying something is efficient and walking off leaves a gap for people to come in and make nonsensical “common sense sounding” arguments about distribution that undermine the argument of economists – even without all the scientific analysis.  Economists can only push past the tribalism if they can improve the way they communicate the strength, logic, robustness, and “scientific” nature of the results the discipline does agree upon.

We should never ignore the politics

An interesting paper by Acemoglu and Robinson, who have long discussed the interaction between economics and politics. The basic point is that economists cannot afford to ignore politics when they make policy prescriptions. It’s well-known that policy prescriptions based on partial equilibrium models can be risky. A&R take that a step further and point out that economic policies can affect political equilibria in unpredictable ways that may end up being counter-productive. For example,

Faced with a trade union exercising monopoly power and raising the wages of its members, most economists would advocate removing or limiting the unions’ ability to exercise this monopoly power, and this is certainly the right policy in some circumstances. But unions do not just influence the way the labor market functions; they also have important implications for the political system. Historically, unions have played a key role in the creation of democracy in many parts of the world, particularly in Western Europe; they have founded, funded and supported political parties, such as the Labour Party in Britain or the Social Democratic parties of Scandinavia, which have had large impacts on public policy and on the extent of taxation and income redistribution, often balancing the political power of established business interests and political elites. Because the higher wages that unions generate for their members are one of the main reasons why people join unions, reducing their market power is likely to foster de-unionization. But this may, by further strengthening groups and interests that were already dominant in society, also change the political equilibrium in a direction involving greater efficiency losses. This case illustrates a more general conclusion, which is the heart of our argument: even when it is possible, removing a market failure need not improve the allocation of resources because of its impact on future political equilibria.

Quote of the day: Eli Dourado on Cowen on Macro

Via Twitter:

When I told Tyler I was confused in PhD Macro I, he said, “Good, that means you understand.”

Ahhh macro.  I think we can all take a lesson from this and recognise the limits of our knowledge – if the specialists that spend their entire lives and focus on hefty amounts of data appreciate their knowledge is limited, I don’t think the rest of us can just magically “intuit” certain knowledge through our “common sense”.  This holds to a lesser degree in all of economics – macro is just especially funktastic.

What does this mean for policy?  It doesn’t mean there is no role for government – we can still view government as a form of social insurance between us all, helping us deal with an uncertain world.  But, it does imply that government micromanagement and fine tuning have to pass a pretty massive burden of proof.  A burden that is hard to pass given that our knowledge is both uncertain and massively conditional.  I’ve heard this points before a few time (here, here, here) … 😉

Series on tax: Part 5 – A primer on consumption tax

Yet more on tax – this is part 5. Here are the blog posts on part 1, part 2, part 2b, part 3, and part 4.

The promised “Part 4b” is still in the pipeline – it’ll appear at some point.

This time we discussed consumption taxes, and the fact that we may not like the idea of taxing consumption differently based on when it occurs.

I avoided talking about commodity taxation and then talking about the result where we don’t want to tax intermediate inputs.  I also avoided going too far into the debate around the Atkinson-Stiglitz paper (Saez here has a great piece(REPEC)).  I feel that when just describing the idea of income, poll, and consumption taxes adding these additional issues would add more confusion and less understanding.  I could have added a bit more at the point where I was talking about Ramsey taxation – especially the point that if people with different ability have different preferences we can use variable consumption taxation as a form of redistribution.  The idea of a progressive consumption tax is interesting.  However, the goal in this article was to make consumption tax relatable to forms of income tax – hopefully that got through 😛

I’m saving a lot of these addition factors for when we introduce the talk on progressivity and the equity-efficiency trade-off for the next article.  Urg.  Let us see if I can manage it in one article!

I have avoided using the term “marginal tax rate”.  I don’t know how I’ve done this.  I suspect it will make an appearence in the next article 😉

 

Government, tax, democracy: Careful now

I note Gareth Morgan is discussing the idea of an independent tax authority.  On paper I don’t disagree, I’ve seen similar sentiments pop up in 2009 and 2011 😉

As mentioned in the 2011 piece though, the idea of what is “democratic” is important.  Recently we touched on this by discussing the appropriate scope for independent monetary policy.

I think the idea of an independent tax authority makes sense for the following:

  • setting a “tax level” given a structure for the tax system that is set by a democratically elected government.  The goal of adjusting the tax level is solely to ensure that the “medium term balance budget” condition is meet … or in other words that the stock of debt to GDP is held at a given target level in the medium-term set by a PTA.

This is fine, this is an operational issue, and implies that if political parties promise to “spend up large” the independent authority will note that this implies the tax burden will have to be higher.  It is transparent, consistent, and neat 🙂

Gareth Morgan is taking things a step too far in my opinion.  He is saying that the authority should set the structure of the tax system itself, rather than leaving it to politicians.  To me, this is an example of a technocrat taking matters too far – it is not up to some tax authority to determine the “optimal level of redistribution”, it is up to society as a whole to push towards this through democratic engagment.  Yes this process is slow and imprecise, but it is preferable to relying on the value judgments of technocrats.

This is not a small distinction.  The idea of having tax levels set to make sure that operational policy is consistent, and parties can’t “lie” is good.  The idea of having the structure of tax policy being set by unelected technocrats who “know best” is not – no matter how many economists belive otherwise 😉

I love economists to the point where I host “sexiest economist” competitions on my blog – but even given this, I don’t believe that a dictatorship of economists is preferable to the democratic ramblings of society as a whole.  And this distinction needs to be made.

Note:  I would even point out that the “technocrats” disagree with each other on issues of tax, adding layers of value judgments makes this even worse – in that sort of environment having technocrats set the structure is even more tenuous.