No QE “free lunch” for NZ

As a general rule of thumb, whenever someone offers you something for nothing they aren’t telling you the full story – and that is exactly what we have with the Greens stating the Reserve Bank should start rebuilding Christchurch themselves by printing money.

Now, in order to come to this conclusion a bunch of points are being mashed together.  So in order to understand what this entails, and why does it in this way isn’t the best way forward, we need to have a think about what such a policy really means by splitting it into “monetary” and “fiscal” policy.

Monetary policy, fiscal policy

Having the RBNZ buy up a bunch of government debt which has been taken on to rebuild Christchurch works through two channels we need to think about distinctly:

  1. Monetary policy – by “increasing the money stock” in this example, they are loosening monetary conditions.
  2. Fiscal policy – by getting the RBNZ to go and fund the rebuild by printing money, we are in essence transferring resources for the rebuild.  They don’t appear from nowhere.

Now here Ganesh Nana states that he thinks RBNZ monetary policy is distinctly wrong – and that we will face deflation.  If that is the case, they should cut interest rates first.  However, he may believe that there is even more risk than that, and that cutting rates towards zero AND putting in place QE is required.  Viewing QE as a form of monetary policy this could make sense.

But, this is far from the consensus view, it is a long way away from households and firms expectations of what we will experience (which determine much of what usually happens with inflation) – and it is far from the way the Greens described it.  In truth, the RBNZ has policy about where it should be – and if it should be looser then it probably shouldn’t be by much.  As a result, we cannot use the monetary policy argument … and QE will increase inflationary pressures.  So from here, I’ll assume that the RBNZ is currently meeting its inflation mandate – a view that is held up by the evidence.

Russel Norman is completely misrepresenting QE by saying that the recent crisis is “evidence it isn’t inflationary”.  QE was put in place to fight the fact that policy was too tight overseas, and they were trying to fight deflation – in essence the fact that inflation stayed near the “target band” in these countries is evidence that QE is indeed inflationary as you would expect … just in the way they were intending.

Fiscal policy

Furthermore, choosing to do QE that is premised on an extension of government borrowing funded by the RBNZ is different to what is being done overseas!  Overseas, much of QE has been the Fed buying existing long-dated Treasury bonds from the private sector.  They haven’t been “financing deficits” persee per se, they have been trying to increase the amount of high powered money in the general economy.

The form of policy being suggested by the Greens is effectively full scale fiscal policy being fully accommodated by the RBNZ, or monetizing debt – it is saying that the government will borrow and the RBNZ will then print money to pay for it, thereby increasing inflation as a tax to pay for it.  Resources do not appear from the ether – no matter how many people inside and outside New Zealand want to pretend this is the case – this is a straight transfer of resources towards rebuilding in Christchurch and away from other places.  [Note:  This view comes from the presumption that the Greens are saying the RBNZ should buy the bonds and then write them off – if the RBNZ is just holding the bonds and expecting repayment, then you are still running a “deficit” it is just being hidden on the RBNZ’s balance sheet instead … in this case we are again easing monetary policy, we have a larger deficit which will need to be paid for with future taxes, and given monetary policy is currently sufficient this will lead to excess inflation].

Now you may believe we should fund the rebuild with a one-off tax – that’s fine, in that case get the government to put a tax in place directly (or to directly cut spending from other place).  However, taxation by stealth of this sort is likely to be worse in multiple ways:

  1. We have betrayed RBNZ independence for virtually no reason … understandably a sneak tax by the RBNZ would make people less likely to believe them in the future about holding to their inflation mandate.  As a result, we run into the time-consistency issue in monetary policy again, and it will become more painful for economy when the RBNZ tries to commit to its inflation mandate again.
  2. We have a relatively rough redistribution of resources due to this.  By putting in our sneak tax through QE, we transfer resources to those with assets, those doing the rebuild, and those who can easily adjust prices/wages – while hurting those on fixed income, and those who have saved.  It is an inflation tax – pure and simple – and as a result, it will initially transfer resources from those who can’t protect themselves (generally the poor) to those who can (generally the rich).  If we introduce the tax through fiscal policy instead we can sort out these distributional issues a little better.
  3. A country that is willing to introduce QE as a clear fiscal transfer – when there is no monetary policy reason – will destroy its credibility with international lenders.  People will scoff at this, but such a policy will increase the level of “inflation insurance” lenders ask for – increasing the cost of credit in New Zealand.

These are obvious and true costs, that have been seen from similar policies around the world for hundreds of years.  QE really isn’t anything new, and if we want a fiscal transfer of this sort just say it (as the Greens previously have to be fair), and do it through fiscal policy – it has nothing to do with the RBNZ.

But the exchange rate, it will get that down!

The constant banging on about the exchange rate and the RBNZ shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the “issues” NZ faces.

The Greens, and Ganesh Nana, are wrong in stating that the RBNZ has failed.  Distinctly and totally wrong.  Things like this:

”No system of monetary policy is perfect and New Zealand cannot remain the last devotee to a failed monetary theory while the rest of the world moves on,” Norman said.

Paint a complete and utter misrepresentation about the lessons from the Global Financial Crisis.  Our flexible inflation targeting framework saved us from a massive crisis at home – while the rest of the world fell apart.  We have learnt that there are issues of financial stability we should have looked at – issues we have discussed for a while – but this is definitely not a reason to start “fine tuning” the economy through the RBNZ.  That is exactly what Labour, the Greens, and NZ First are trying to do … and its something that has been shown time and again as folly!

We can easily make the case for the exchange rate having been persistently too high – the key word there is persistently – and the key point that comes out is that, as a result, our real exchange rate is too high.

The high real exchange rate is not due to monetary policy – which is cyclical in nature – it is due to persistent structural factors.  Things related to government policy and competition policy.

The confusion stems from the fact that the combination of the current nominal exchange rate, inflation rate, and nominal interest rate are the indicators that move around with monetary policy.  They do, and they tell us things about the stance of monetary policy – but the RBNZ only makes up one part of the determinant of these factors.  The RBNZ works to achieve its inflation mandate while other institutions in the economy run around and do what they do.

So what happens to the real exchange rate when we print money to do some building in Christchurch?  Well if this activity persists it will likely go up as we are funding more government activity through an “inflation tax”.  If it is indeed a one-off tax, then the outcome is more uncertain.

Lets stop dwelling on the exchange rate like it is some shackle holding us back, and that we have a silver bullet to shoot it down.  The macroeconomy is not, and never will be that simple.  Instead lets us “why” NZ keeps running current account deficits and why our discount rates are so high – is it because we treat investments differently, is it because we have higher growth expectations, is it because government spending is too distortionary, is it because we have issues with competitiveness in the non-tradable sector, is it because we are naturally impatient people?  The one thing we know, is that it is not because of monetary policy – that does not follow.

Conclusion

To summarise I’m saying:

  1. We don’t need QE in NZ, as we have enough monetary stimulus (and if not we can cut interest rates further).
  2. What is being suggested isn’t even QE – its the monetization of government debt, effectively a inflation tax to pay for the rebuild in Canterbury.
  3. It is unlikely that such a tax is the “best” way of raising the revenue to rebuild Christchurch – which should be the primary question.

This is the main gist of what is going on here.

Outsourcing competence

So it seems that Stuff has decided that now it’s outsourcing its journalism to the public, it might as well try to do it with other people’s discipines as well – that combined with not knowing what economics is has led to the question “how do we fix the economy” 😉

The first solution has been released, and in true communist/NZ Inc style thought the solutions boil down to saying people shouldn’t be allowed the things they actually want and picking winners.

Now to be honest I do not blame the author of the piece – he was doing exactly what was asked of him, to frame the economy in the way he wanted it to be.  To “fix” the ways that the economy wasn’t doing what he values.

But that isn’t the way social groups should work.  We aren’t a dictatorship, we shouldn’t have a body of “enlightened individuals” telling us how and what to consume.  The fact is if households are willing to sacrifice other opportunities and income to live the “kiwi dream” they should be allowed to.

Goals such as “catching Australia”, being “more productive”, battling perceived “inequalities” of somethings – these are arbitrary goals that do not express the trade-offs we face as a set of people.  The real goal should be to create an environment where the individuals in society can make the best use of the scarce set of resources we have at our disposal, in order to satisfy their preferences.

New Zealand is not a machine, its a community of individuals – an economy isn’t something to be “fixed” it is a combination of institutions, relationships, and people … and any “issue” has to do with concerns about these relationships, not overarching goals to pick winners or tell people what to consume because, in our arrogance, we think we are smarter than they are.

Sidenote:  If Stuff does believe the economy can be “fixed” like a machine are they going to ask similar questions about physical disciplines – is the next assignment going to be “how would you cure cancer”, followed by “how would you build a perpetual motion machine” and “how would you derive the theory of everything“.

Update:  So after having a computer scientist say we should give up the kiwi dream and focus on IT in the first article, now we have someone involved in commercial and residential property saying we should cut interest rates and accept house price inflation to fix the economy.  Even as an economist, I find the level of blatent self interest surprising – and relatively humorus 🙂 .  Maybe I should write one in saying we need more economic research into the economy by economic consultants, so we can make more informed decisions and transfer resources to me … I mean and make the right decisions.

Update 2:  Wow, so we should ban people from below median income from borrowing.  Simultaneously violating the rights of those who are poor, and making it impossible for people to realistically smooth consumption over their lifecycle – and that is “assuming the best” and ignoring that it will lead to expensive black market credit for the poor, which will just make them worse off than they are now.

As well as illustrating how widely spread economic illiteracy, this exercise has shown me just how much people from every part of the political spectrum want to run other peoples lives.   And I don’t just mean economic illiteracy in the sense of not understanding the subtles of the literature – I mean economic illiteracy in terms of not understanding the basics of how other people in society are different and face different trade-offs.

Guess what, some people on below median incomes borrow because … they are fairly certain they will earn more in the future.  In fact if you look at the data that is where a large amount of the housing borrowing takes place, as you would expect if you had spent some time trying to understand the issue.  Such as by studying 100 level economics.

In fact the only reason I’m willing to publicly be so rude about this recommendation is that I find the treatment of consumers and the poor of this piece to be morally abhorent.  I don’t care who you are, if you attack the poor for being poor I have no time or patience to discuss your confusion with kid gloves.

An important warning regarding the monetary policy fine-tuning

A recent opinion piece in the Herald, pitting Don Brash and Brendan Doyle in to debate the issue of monetary policy was good.  They seemed to agree that, ultimately, any issue is one of the real exchange rate – which is due to real economy factors.  A point I’ve heard a number of times before 😉

However, all this debate reminds me of a speech by Bernanke back in the day.  The choice quote:

Although a strict rules-based framework for monetary policy has evident drawbacks, notably its inflexibility in the face of unanticipated developments, supporters of rules in their turn have pointed out–with considerable justification–that the record of monetary policy under unfettered discretion is nothing to crow about. In the United States, the heyday of discretionary monetary policy can be dated as beginning in the early 1960s, a period of what now appears to have been substantial over-optimism about the ability of policymakers to “fine-tune” the economy. Contrary to the expectation of that era’s economists and policymakers, however, the subsequent two decades were characterized not by an efficiently managed, smoothly running economic machine but by high and variable inflation and an unstable real economy, culminating in the deep 1981-82 recession. Although a number of factors contributed to the poor economic performance of this period, I think most economists would agree that the deficiencies of a purely discretionary approach to monetary policy–including over-optimism about the ability of policy to fine-tune the economy, low credibility, vulnerability to political pressures, short policy horizons, and insufficient appreciation of the costs of high inflation–played a central role.

Is there then no middle ground for policymakers between the inflexibility of ironclad rules and the instability of unfettered discretion? My thesis today is that there is such a middle ground–an approach that I will refer to as constrained discretion–and that it is fast becoming the standard approach to monetary policy around the world, including in the United States

“Constrained discretion” is (arguably) very much the flexible inflation targeting framework we use now – the determination to “fine tune” is one that is coming out increasingly, and is based on an illusion of understanding and control regarding the macroeconomy (that and a few fallacious ideas of how things have panned out 😉 ).

No-one is arguing against having a further look at financial regulation, and trying to understand what has happened there.  However, this provides no case for messing around with the way the RBNZ performs monetary policy and the existence of a floating exchange rate – and in their determination to “do something” there are a set of politicians, journalists, and other analysts/economists trying to take us down a dark path.

Dealing with debt, financial regulation, and the lender of last resort

Previously we’ve talked a lot here about the lender of last resort function of a central bank.  In discussions a trade-off is often discussed, whereby having a lender of last resort can help to prevent financial crises when financial intermediaries are suffering from issues of “illiquidity”, but are not “insolvent” – however, the existence of a LOLR can in turn lead to moral hazard … where financial intermediaries and lenders are willing to take on “too much risk” and charger borrowers “too little”.

Although the discussion of these issues has a long history in economics, Thomas Sargent’s article (REPEC) on the issue – and the solution mentioned – are worth reading.

Now we live in a history dependent world.  Yes, we have had a global banking system willing to take on too much risk – due in a large part to issues of asymmetric information and an implicit solution subsidy of risk.  Yes, in this environment debt accumulated, and the existence of debt and the following credit constraints on people with “useful projects” that they could invest in is having a big negative impact – likely much bigger than any “social boost” that may have existed from the additional marginal projects that took place with easy credit.

We have an environment where people think there is a real risk of the failure of financial intermediaries.  Now if we understood “why” we could ask if there is a solution.  What are some reasons:

  1. There is too much debt.  If we saw this as an issue, we could convert bondholders into equity holders in banks.  After all, isn’t a government bailout really just a transfer from non-depositors to depositors in the bank?
  2. There is no trust.  There was a “capital stock” of trust that was built up between financial institutions, a stock that was destroyed and will have to be rebuilt.  This can be expected to keep hurting the efficiency of financial markets for a long time.
  3. Central banks/governments have lost credibility as lenders of last resort.  I think this is compelling – everyone talks about “too big to fail”, but exactly what that means, exactly what the “insurance” is, and exactly how the “insurance” is paid for are questions that are still up in the air. One can use Life Cover Quotes to find the best life insurance provider.
For me the key issue is the last one – as the negative impact of the first two is “endogenously determined” by the credibility of the financial system stemming from regulation.  The fact we have a government monopoly for fiat money, and direct management, combined with a LOLR function, ensures this.
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Note:  Anyone reading here since the crisis has been in full swing will think I lean strongly on the side of constant bailouts.  However, this is far from the case – I only started writing in favour of them once we already had a crisis where this needed to be the case.  In 2007, once the crisis had begun but a few months before Bear Sterns, I was writing like some sort of “purging our evils” Austrian economist.  After Lehman Brother’s collapse, even a half pint analyst like myself saw the issue of a lack of trust even when it was unclear whether there was a bailout or not 😛 (it was interesting reading these old posts, the lack of clarity around what was going on was even worse than I remember!).   By the time what happened was clear, we had switched our tune in favour of bailouts for that period of time – and even I found the ECB’s call to attack moral hazard in the middle of the crisis strange, even though I saw that as a big issue.

This was seen as a major issue coming into the crisis, it was viewed as a key issue during the crisis (I would argue that the efficiency of NGDP targeting would still depend on a banking system without bank runs), and now during these later stages of the crisis it is an issue receiving a lot of research and taken into account for regulation.  Mainstream economics has the tools to understand what has happened, and hopefully policies can be developed that ensure that the next economic crisis is something completely different.

Cartoon: How to find out if someone is an economist

The always awesome Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal (SMBC) popped this comic up.

The thing is, when I saw the first panel the first question that popped into my mind was “nominal or real dollars” – the amount I ask that, all day long, is ridiculous.  These things are always best when they are relatively true …

The outlook for oil: An interview with Hamilton

Oilprice.com has a good interview with James Hamilton from Econbrowser up on their site.  I’d suggest taking a look 😉

As will one day become clear, one of the big drivers of the slowdown in the developed world has been the sharp increase in commodity prices – specifically oil.  While the global financial crisis was a major driver, it is also possible to make the case that part of the reason for the run up in debt was an assumption by households and individuals that the lift in oil prices would be temporary – when in fact it looks like it is a relatively persistent shift up.

As stated here:

James StaffordWhenever oil prices spike politicians are quick to blame speculators and oil companies for manipulating the markets. Are you in agreement with this – are speculators and oil companies to blame? Or are there other factors that are overlooked deliberately or otherwise by the mainstream media?

James Hamilton: The story is pretty simple, and even though politicians may try to distort it, you’d hope that the media would do a better job of reporting the truth than they have.  World oil production was basically stagnant between 2005 and 2008, even though world GDP was up 17%.  With economic growth like that you’d normally expect increased demand, particularly from the rapidly growing emerging economies, and in fact China did increase its consumption by a million barrels a day over these 3 years.  But with no more oil being produced, that meant that the rest of us– the U.S., Europe, Japan– had to reduce our consumption.  It took a pretty big price run-up before that happened.  To those claiming the price is too high, I would ask, how high do you think the price had to go to persuade Americans to reduce oil consumption by a million barrels a day?

We have seen demand rising (on the back of increasing productive capacity in the developing world) while supply has stagnated.  Many times people have told me “there is heap of oil lying around” – and this is true – but the question is, “what is the cost of extracting this oil”.  Even some of the most optimistic people say that we shouldn’t expect oil prices to fall below $70US a barrel in current dollar terms.

The big saviour will hopefully be technology – higher prices drives the incentive to find substitutes.  However, that doesn’t stop the intervening period being painful.