Thoughts on South Canterbury Finance saga

The receivers are in, and the government is throwing in $1.7bn in order to buy assets they expect to get a return of $700m from.  Sounds like a typical New Zealand investment to me 😉

There are a few points to come out of this.  In some sort of order these are:

  1. The government had to pay the money when the receivers came in – they had no real choice, after all SCF was guaranteed by government.
  2. However, it does show you the type of cost that can be associated with such a scheme – and raises the question of whether putting finance companies in the scheme was a good idea (both Agnitio and myself were skeptical).
  3. It is apparent that the scheme may have led to some dodgy lending in that sector.  I am genuinely concerned about what other moral hazard issues will appear over the coming year – is this just the tip of the iceberg from a poorly designed scheme, or is it just one unfortunate failure.
  4. Questions have to be raised regarding the price placed on risk by the guarantee – was it really high enough?
  5. Why is anyone defending Alan Hubbard when he used other peoples money to make risky bets that made people like him – just to fail and have the rest of New Zealand paying for it?  Running a company under a government guarantee and not following best practice is immoral – no matter who you are.
  6. This can’t be compared to TARP, and the lack of insurance would not have made this like Lehman Brothers.  The scope for contagion from a finance company failure like this is small – which implies absent the scheme the government should have just let this company fail.
  7. Another nail in the credit rating coffin?  What credit rating did SCF have at the start of the deposit guarantee scheme?

Another point is that this statement:

Furthermore, being in control of the receivership process takes the pressure off the receiver to quickly sell any assets

Is actually a good one, if they feel the assets would be shot off at fire sale prices.  This is one of the main lessons from TARP.  However, the sad thing is that the government is stuck buying them at an inflated price instead 🙁

Surely this tells us that it is at least near the time to get rid of this deposit guarantee scheme – and why not do it retroactively so they all don’t “fail” just before the scheme runs out.  Investors that get burned because they saw a high return and decided to face a high risks should have to deal with the consequences of it.

Update:  Bunch of details listed down on Rates Blog.

A fishy conclusion from a Fisher relation

Interesting.  Both a Fed economist and Stephen Williamson (the author of one of my undergrad macro books) have been saying that persistently low interest rates “cause” deflation in the long run (ht Economist’s view) [Lots of others, WCI *, Money blog, Angry Bear, Paul Krugman, Money Illusion].  This seems a little counter-intuitive, but this doesn’t mean anything is wrong – I’m going to write down a few of my thoughts to see if I can figure out what is going on.

I mean, I agree that the Fisher equation must hold, and I agree that the long-run real interest rate will be exogenous.  But this ain’t enough to tell me that having the Fed keep rates at 0.25% forever “causes” deflation.

Why?  The average Fed rate and inflation expectations are both endogenously determined – they seem to be treating the Fed’s choice as exogenous, when they follow a decision rule. Yes it is true that the cash rate at a point in time is a choice variable – but the average cash rate in the long-run should effectively be determined by the real interest rate and long-run inflation target. [Update Think of it this way, I’m really assuming the central bank follows a Taylor rule and that determines the nominal rate given the inflation target.  The big kicker for any argument like this will be the way inflation expectations are formed].

As a result, we could just as easily interpret rates staying at 0.25% forever as an indicator that inflation expectations are -1.75% -> in other words we observe a low nominal interest rate BECAUSE there is deflation.  Fundamentally, this tells us nothing – as the Fisher relationship is an equilibrium statement, not a casual relationship.

In fact, if there is indeed a forecast of rates staying at 0.25% forever there is a STRONG argument for making policy more stimulatory now – is that what the guy is trying to say?

If we want to discuss a causal relationship we need a causal model of our endogenous variables right – the Fisher equation is not this.

Update: I see where they are coming from now.  However, I believe the key issue is with regards to current policy – fundamentally the mentioning of deflation was taken in context of the CURRENT disinflation going on in the USA, and it seemed like a statement that was pushing for an increase in rates to avoid deflation.

I’m also nervous about the use of the word “cause” when any observed relationship in the data will not necessarily be clear – but I’m always nervous about causation so oww well.  Namely, if I see an average cash rate of 0.25% and average -1.75% inflation I wouldn’t say “aha, having the cash rate at that level caused that” – I would want more information on how inflation expectations got there in the first place …

The difference between compulsions: Tax and forced savings

Just having a look at the speech from Labour on savings.  One bit that has caught my eye so far is:

The Government collected tax, which is compulsory, and saved it for the future.

Now this is true, tax is compulsory.  And one way of looking at “compulsory savings” is as an increase in the tax rate.  But I think there is a more fundamental difference that makes compulsory savings a bit more ridiculous.

We pay tax as part of redistributive policy – tax is used to reallocate resources effectively.  We justify this morally by saying a couple of things:

  1. Land and other forms of endowed capital are fundamentally communally owned – but we need private ownership to ensure an efficient allocation of resources.  As a result, tax acts as a form of social rent – as part of the social contract.
  2. If we looked at society objectively – without knowing whether we would be born into poverty or wealth – we would say that some level of redistribution is desirable (Rawlsian justification).

So we have compulsory redistribution, which is justified by the “social contract” and the belief that the democratic process enforces this implicit contract.

Compulsory savings doesn’t have this justification.  We are taking someones wealth away from them, and then giving it back to them later – like when a kid in the playground takes another kids ball and plays with it, giving it back to them at the end of the lunch break.

The only “social contract” argument you could make here is that individual in society WANT to save, but lack discipline (time inconsistency).  But forced regulation is not the best solution if this is the case – providing institutions and incentives that help to solve the time inconsistency issue, while still allowing choice, is the way to go.

As a result, justifying compulsory savings on the basis that “tax is compulsory” is a slippery slope.

I will get back to reading the speech tonight I guess – I’ve sort of paused there 😀

Economists in agreement?

So Don Brash spoke out against compulsory savings, as did Gareth Morgan (note that both would benefit personally from the policy, to a large degree).

John Carran’s article sums up how Infometrics feels about the policy.  And I am under the impression that every single NZ economics blogger that has touched the issue has said that compulsion is the wrong policy.

So is it me, or do we have an issue where economists in New Zealand all seem to agree?  And given this, does it make it more likely, or less likely that the policy will go ahead?

Savings working group

I am a bit tied down at present (which should be obvious by my lack of response to comments). However, I just had to pop around to say that I approve of the team for the savings working group – bunch of great thinkers that will look at the issue objectively, and come up with some genuinely useful solutions/analysis.

Looking forward to their reports.

Update:  Nice run down, and terms of reference.

Let me get this straight

One of the main reasons the government wants to crack down on alcohol is because of thescenes no civilized society can relish“, which is when people of the age of 18-24 go into town and run amok – causing definite damage to other people, in some way, or something.

So they are introducing a policy that will give people the incentive to go into town, instead of drinking at home?  What policy – well they are splitting the drinking age, so you can drink at a pub at 18 but you have to be 20 to buy liquor to drink at home.

I mean seriously – they are increasing the “price” of drinking at home, so more people will just drink in town (where it is likely more student bars with low margins and high quantities will open), and with them already in town there can be even more people to “run amok”.

This is one place where I agree with Labour rather than the government (removed statement as it made it sound like I normally agree with the government – when I usually disagree with everyone, including myself often) – if there is an issue it comes from our view of alcohol, an inappropriate externality tax on alcohol, or education around alcohol.  So instead of chucking in dumb regulations with mammoth unintended consequences, lets just try to be mature (and adult) about our treatment of alcohol – and in fact all other drugs.